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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In summary, it is clear that when the legislature has deter-
mined that a judgment should be denied collateral estoppel effect,
it has codified that intent.201 Therefore, in the absence of such an
express legislative intent, it is submitted that the courts should not
preclude application of collateral estoppel absent circumstances
which strongly suggest otherwise.
Jack Wilk
Collateral estoppel effect of a default judgment upon a medical
malpractice action
The preceding case demonstrated that harassment violation
proceedings may properly be imbued with collateral estoppel ef-
fect.202 Among other things, the threat of a prison sentence, the
decorum of city court proceedings, and the active defense con-
ducted by the defendant in Gilberg evinced the defendant's aware-
ness of the significance of the proceedings.20 3 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals, equating such harassment conviction to a traffic
infraction conviction, held that it should not be accorded collateral
estoppel effect.204 Consider, however, a default judgment 205 or a
COMPLAINTS PCT. HEARINGS PCT. HEARINGS PCT.
YEAR FILED HEARINGS HEARINGS BYPASSED BYPASSED APPEALED APPEALED
1980 1,079,266 521,691 48.3% 557,575 51.7% 1,170 .22%
1979 1,145,538 569,604 49.5% 575,934 50.3% 1,350 .24%
1978 1,102,174 545,758 49.5% 556,416 50.5% 1,135 .21%
1977 965,423 466,058 48.3% 499,365 51.7% 922 .20%
1976 951,394 460,982 48.5% 490,412 51.5% 680 .15%
[1980] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 7; [1979] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHI-
CLES ANN. REP. 13; [1978] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 9; [1977] N.Y.S.
DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 23; [1976] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP.
12. Notably, the opportunity for a hearing is bypassed in over 50% of the traffic infraction
cases. Of even greater interest is that when hearings are conducted less than one percent of
the decisions rendered are appealed.
201 See note 180 supra.
202 See notes 189-191 and accompanying text supra.
203 See id.
204 See note 177 and accompanying text supra.
20I See CPLR 3215 (1970). "When a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to
trial of an action reached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any
other neglect to proceed, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him." Id. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that "a judgment by default is just as conclusive an
adjudication. . . [on] essential [facts] to support the judgment as one rendered after answer
and contest." Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U.S. 683, 691 (1895); accord,
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confession of judgment20 6 executed pursuant to a physician's action
to recover payment for medical services rendered. Although it
would seem to be unjust to accord collateral estoppel effect to
these types of judgments, the New York courts long have held that
the existence of a default judgment or a confession of judgment
will collaterally estop a malpractice cause of action arising from
the same transaction.20 7 Recently, in Kossover v. Trattler,20 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, had occasion to consider
this issue. Although the majority, citing a technicality, held that
collateral estoppel properly was not invoked in the instant case,209
a vigorous concurrence criticized the rule in New York which per-
mits a collateral estoppel bar to be founded upon a default
judgment.210
In Kossover, the defendant Dr. Trattler previously had
brought an action against Mr. Kossover to recover for professional
services rendered "'on or about the 21st day of May, 1974.'-'211
The patient's failure to answer the complaint resulted in a default
judgment in favor of Dr. Trattler.212 Subsequently, Mr. Kossover
commenced an action for medical malpractice "allegedly commit-
Barber v. Kendall, 158 N.Y. 401, 405, 53 N.E. 1, 2 (1899); Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N.Y. 351, 358
(1885). Notably, the New York courts have accorded collateral estoppel effect to default
judgments arising from various causes of action. E.g., Reich v. Cochran, 151 N.Y. 122, 125-
29, 45 N.E. 367, 367-69 (1896) (default judgment for nonpayment of rent bars subsequent
action alleging that lease was intended as a mortgage and was usurious); Jordan v. Van
Epps, 85 N.Y. 427, 433-37 (1881) (default judgment in a partition suit is a bar to an action
to recover dower); Roberts v. Strauss, 108 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951)
(default judgment wherein defendant was held to be negligent is res judicata in an action to
redress personal injuries); see Note, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1158, 1158 (1961).
2"8 See CPLR 3218 (1970). "[A] judgment by confession may be entered, without an
action, either for money due or to become due... upon an affidavit executed by the defen-
dant ... stating [inter alia] the sum for which judgment may be entered ... [and] the
facts out of which the debt arose . . . ." Id.; see Gates v. Preston, 41 N.Y. 113, 115-16
(1869) (confession of judgment and payment of outstanding bill for medical services bars
subsequent medical malpractice action).
207 E.g., Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N.Y. 150, 152 (1878); Gates v. Preston, 41 N.Y. 113, 114-16
(1869); Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb. 534, 538-39 (1860).
208 82 App. Div. 2d 610, 442 N.Y.S.2d 554 (2d Dep't 1981), af'g 104 Misc. 2d 424, 428
N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980).
209 82 App. Div. 2d 610, 612, 442 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (2d Dep't 1981).
210 Id. at 613, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
211 Id. at 610, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555. Dr. Trattler had operated to repair, for the second
time, the herniation of a scar which had been caused by an earlier operation. 104 Misc. 2d at
425, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
212 82 App. Div. 2d at 610, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555;. 104 Misc. 2d at 425, 428 N.Y.S.2d at
403-04.
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ted. . . 'between May 27, 1974 and June 22nd, 1974.' 11213 Prior to
trial, Dr. Trattler moved to amend his answer to include the af-
firmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata, contend-
ing that the default judgment precluded the plaintiff's medical
malpractice claim.214 Denying these motions, the trial court held
that collateral estoppel should not apply since the plaintiff's ab-
sence in the prior action prevented the court from considering the
malpractice issue.2 15 Alternatively, the court stated that collateral
estoppel was unavailable in the instant case because the dates of
medical service alleged in Dr. Trattler's action and in Mr. Koss-
over's action were dissimilar.2 1
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
firmed.217 Writing for the majority, Justice Gulotta218 stated that
preliminary to the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
an identity of issues between the prior and subsequent actions
must be demonstrated.2 9 Noting that the dates at issue in the
plaintiff's medical malpractice complaint and in the prior default
"1 82 App. Div. 2d at 610, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555; 104 Misc. 2d at 425, 428 N.Y.S.2d at
404. Mr. Kossover's action for malpractice was commenced in March 1976, against North
Shore Hospital and Dr. Trattler. 82 App. Div. 2d at 610, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
214 82 App. Div. 2d at 610-11, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555; 104 Misc. 2d at 425, 428 N.Y.S.2d at
404.
21 104 Misc. 2d at 428, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 405. The court discussed three cases relied
upon by Dr. Trattler. Id. at 426, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 404. The court noted that in Blair v.
Bartlett, 75 N.Y. 150 (1878), the Court of Appeals had held that an action for recoupment of
fees, wherein the defendant had withdrawn his answer, barred a subsequent action for mal-
practice. 104 Misc. 2d at 426, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 404. The court further noted that in Gates v.
Preston, 41 N.Y. 113 (1869), a judgment by confession was held to bar a malpractice suit.
104 Misc. 2d at 426, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 404. Finally, the court recognized that in Goldfarb v.
Cranin, 35 Misc. 2d 126, 229 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962), the doctrine of
collateral estoppel was invoked because the patient had interposed a counterclaim for mal-
practice but failed to appear. 104 Misc. 2d at 426, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 404. Justice Niehoff
distinguished these cases as indeterminative because, in Blair and Gates, the Court of Ap-
peals had considered the quality of services rendered, and in Goldfarb, the defendant had
chosen not to defend the malpractice action which he had instituted. Id. at 427, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 404-05. Justice Niehoff concluded that a medical malpractice action should not
be collaterally estopped absent actual litigation of such issue. Id. at 428, 428 N.Y.S.2d at
405.
215 104 Misc. 2d at 428-29, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
217 82 App. Div. 2d at 611, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
218 Joining Justice Gulotta in the majority opinion were Justices Mangano and
O'Connor. Justice Gibbons concurred in a separate opinion, joined by Justice Lazar. Id. at
624, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
9 Id. at 612, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555. See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46
N.Y.2d 481, 485, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1979); Schuylkill Fuel Corp.
v. B.&C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929).
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judgment were different, the court ruled that the plaintiff's suit
presented a novel claim. 220 Thus, the court concluded, the trial
court was correct in refusing to collaterally estop the plaintiff's
malpractice cause of action.221
In a concurring opinion, Justice Gibbons chided the majority
for its failure to address the unjust results occasioned by New
York's archaic and inequitable default judgment collateral estoppel
rule.222 Notably, the concurrence assailed the practice of New York
courts in equating the questions whether services were rendered
and whether such rendered services were deficient.223 Indeed, ob-
served Justice Gibbons, "implicit in the finding [by a New York
court] that the fee was earned, there . . . [is] also a finding that
the treatment was beneficial and therefore not the proper subject
for future litigation on the malpractice action by the patient. '224
Preferring an approach antithetical to that traditionally adhered to
in New York, the concurrence posited that a patient's medical mal-
practice claim should be deemed independent of his physician's
cause of action for payment for services rendered, and that a col-
lateral estoppel bar should attach only to such discrete issues as
had been litigated previously.22 5 Otherwise, asserted the concur-
rence, patients would be obligated to interpose their malpractice
claims during the pendancy of their doctor's action for remunera-
tion, thereby denying the patients the "right to seek recourse at a
time of, and in the forum of their choice. ' 226 Additionally, the con-
220 82 App. Div. 2d at 611, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
221 Id. at 612, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
222 Id. at 613, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
223 Id. at 615-19, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 557-60 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
224 Id. at 619, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
226 Id. at 615-19, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 557-60 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Justice Gibbons
quoted decisions from several jurisdictions in support of his contention that" '[t]he better
view ... is that the actions, one by the physician for services and the other by the patient
for malpractice, are independent and remain so unless and until the patient, when sued for
services injects the issue of malpractice, either to defeat the claim, or to obtain damages by
way of recoupment or counterclaim.'" Id. at 615, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (Gibbons, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Leslie v. Mollica, 236 Mich. 610, 615, 211 N.W. 267, 268 (1926)) (emphasis
supplied by Justice Gibbons).
226 82 App. Div. 2d at 620, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Justice Gib-
bons further asserted that New York's default judgment collateral estoppel rule subjects
malpractice claimants to inequities and dilemmas. First, the concurrence noted "the de-
structive effect ... [which the application of collateral estoppel] has upon the rights of a
defendant, who, in opting not to oppose one claim, finds that he loses another, a conse-
quence which was never within his contemplation at the time of his default." Id. at 613, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 556-57 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Second, the concurrence observed that if the
malpractice plaintiff, in conformance with the New York rule, had interposed his malprac-
19811
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currence observed that the New York rule could prompt defen-
dants to adjudicate petty claims out of all proportion to their sig-
nificance for fear that latent issues subsumed within such petty
claims might subsequently be foreclosed.227
It is submitted that Justice Gibbons' concurring opinion in
Kossover correctly called for a reexamination of New York's incon-
testable application of collateral estoppel to default judgments.225
Surely, the present approach is violative of the spirit of the Court
of Appeals' decision in Schwartz v. Public Administrator,229
wherein the Court enunciated several factors to be considered in
employing the collateral estoppel doctrine.23 0 In light of these fac-
tors, which include the significance of the claim which is to be ac-
corded collateral estoppel effect, the forum in which such claim
was litigated, and the extent of the litigation,231 it appears that
New York's rigid application of collateral estoppel to default judg-
ments and confessions of judgment improperly precludes medical
malpractice plaintiffs from an opportunity to litigate meritorious
claims. Indeed, it is submitted that a brief analysis of all of the
Schwartz factors would illustrate vividly the impropriety of ascrib-
ing collateral estoppel effect to medical fees, default judgments,
and confessions of judgment.23 2
tice claim during the physician's action for payment for services, "an injustice . . . [might
nevertheless] be worked on the . . . [claimant] because the claim for medical malpractice
could exceed the jurisdictional monetary limits of the court in which the default judgment
was obtained." Id. at 617, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 559 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
22- Id. at 620, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (citing Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York,
44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165, 177 (1969)). Of course, the application of collateral estoppel to all
"necessarily implied" issues, Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N.Y. 351, 358 (1885), results in decreased
foreseeability as to the consequences of a default judgment. Note, Collateral Estoppel in
Default Judgments: The Case for Abolition, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 522, 523-24 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Note, The Case for Abolition]. Consequently, "collateral estoppel, unless con-
fined, may force the parties to litigate not only the claim asserted in the pleadings but all
others-including those presently unanticipated-which might involve some of the same
issues." Note, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 647, 650 (1952) [herein-
after cited as Note, Estoppel by Judgment].
228 See 82 App. Div. 2d at 613, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
229 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
220 See The Survey, note 164 supra.
221 Id.
222 A brief recitation of several of the Schwartz factors, see The Survey note 164 supra,
is illustrative:
1) The size of the claim. Although not evident in Kossover, the size of the physician's claim
for services rendered may differ significantly from his patient's malpractice claim. In one
New York case in which collateral estoppel effect was accorded to a confession of judgment,
the physician's claim was for $6.58, while the malpractice claim was almost 1000 times
[Vol. 56:171
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Of course, the New York courts have defended their position.
Reasoning that the merit of a physician's action for recoupment of
his fee, as evidenced by a default judgment, is indicative of the
illegitimacy of a malpractice cause of action, the state's courts have
concluded that litigation of a malpractice claim in such circum-
stance properly may be estopped.3 3 It is submitted, however, that
greater. See Gates v. Preston, 41 N.Y. 113, 113 (1869). Clearly, in such a situation, it would
appear that a patient would attach much less significance to his physician's claim than to
his own medical malpractice claim. Hence, the propriety of according collateral estoppel
effect to the physician's default judgment certainly would be questionable.
2) The forum of the prior litigation. The decision to default may be influenced by such a
consideration when, for example, the amount of a patient's medical malpractice claim ex-
ceeds the jurisdictional limits of the court chosen by the physician. Surely, it would be un-
fair to require a malpractice claimant to subject himself to a jurisdictional monetary limit in
order to avoid the collateral estoppel effect of a default judgment. See Jordahl v. Berry, 72
Minn. 110, 123, 75 N.W. 10, 12 (1898). But see CPLR 325(b) (1972) (when court in which
action "is pending does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief to which the parties are
entitled, a court having such jurisdiction may remove the action to itself upon motion").
3) The use of initiative; and 4) The extent of the litigation. These factors relate to the vigor
of the patient's defense in the physician's action to recoup payment for services rendered.
Of course, in the case of a default judgment, there is no defense. See CPLR 3215(a) (1970 &
Supp. 1980-1981); note 205 supra. Certainly, the absence of a thorough adjudication of the
patient's malpractice claim during the physician's action would appear to preclude estop-
ping the litigation of such issue in the patient's medical malpractice suit.
5) The competence and experience of counsel. An important factor in evaluating a patient's
decision to default or enter into a confession of judgment is whether legal counsel was con-
sulted. Absent legal advice, a patient may not appreciate that his malpractice claim will be
estopped should he fail to defeat his physician's action. See Note, Estoppel by Judgment,
supra note 227, at 654 n.38.
6) Indications of a compromise verdict. Clearly, when a confession of judgment is entered
into, the likelihood exists that the medical malpractice claimant was merely settling an out-
standing debt. Indeed, it is conceivable that the patient settled the debt in order to avoid
detraction from his medical malpractice claim, not to concede the invalidity of such claim.
In any event, the intent of the patient in paying his medical debt must be examined prior to
the employment of collateral estoppel.
233 See, e.g., Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N.Y. 150, 154 (1878). Other considerations also under-
lie the New York rule. Significantly, when a defendant appears in an action, he is provided
with an opportunity to prove the proper disposition of the questions presented. Vestal, The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 486
(1981). Apparently, the investment of time and money involved in defending some issues
creates an inference that the failure to raise other potential defenses constitutes an admis-
sion of the invalidity of such defenses. See Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157
U.S. 683, 691 (1895); Vestal, supra, at 495; Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Na-
ture of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 164-69; Note, Estoppel by Judgment,
supra note 227, at 654. Moreover, unlitigated claims may be so closely related to adjudi-
cated issues that the preclusion of a subsequent action asserting such unlitigated claims is a
foreseeable consequence. Fairchild, Arabatzis and Smith, Inc. v. Prometco Co., 470 F. Supp.
610, 617 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Thus, "when a given finding necessarily underlies a judgment,
and the judgment's very existence can be explained only by assuming the fact to be thus
and so, the fact may become the basis of an estoppel even if it was not litigated in the
19811
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this is a questionable means of protecting the parties to the action
and the courts from duplicative litigation. On the one hand, it
would appear that the requisite identity of issues, upon which col-
lateral estoppel must be founded, is absent. Indeed, the majority of
jurisdictions have held that a physician's action for fees and a pa-
tient's medical malpractice cause of action are distinct and inde-
pendent.5 4 On the other hand, irrespective of whether a medical
malpractice claim is identical to a physician's cause of action for
collection of his fees, it is clear that in the case of a default judg-
ment or a confession of judgment, the patient has not had a "full
and fair opportunity" to litigate his malpractice claim. 3 5 Clearly,
since such an opportunity to litigate was contemplated by the
Court of Appeals in Schwartz, 238 any rule which would accord col-
lateral estoppel effect to a default judgment or a confession of
earlier action." SIEGEL § 464, at 614. Notably, the New York courts have considered a medi-
cal malpractice cause of action and a physician's cause of action for remuneration to be so
related. See note 207 supra.
213 E.g., Goble v. Dillon, 86 Ind. 327, 337-38 (1882); Leslie v. Mollica, 236 Mich. 610,
615, 211 N.W. 267, 268 (1926); Jordahl v. Berry, 72 Minn. 119, 125-26, 75 N.W. 10, 11-13
(1898); Gwynn v. Wilhelm, 226 Or. 606, 360 P.2d 312, 314 (1961). In the majority of jurisdic-
tions, a patient's claim for malpractice is deemed independent of a doctor's claim for recov-
ery of his fee "unless and until the patient, when sued for services, injects the issue of
malpractice." Leslie v. Mollica, 236 Mich. 610, 615, 211 N.W. 267, 268 (1926); see Barton v.
Southwick, 258 Ill. 515, 522, 101 N.E. 928, 929-30 (1913) (per curiam); Sale v. Eichberg, 105
Tenn. 333, 59 S.W. 1020, 1024 (1900); Ressequie v. Byers, 52 Wis. 650, 656, 9 N.W. 779, 781
(1881). Notably, commentators uniformly oppose the New York rule. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment d (1942); SIEGEL § 451, at 598; 5 WK&M 1 5011.30; Rosenberg,
Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 165, 195 (1969); Note, The Case for
Abolition, supra note 227, at 537; Note, Estoppel by Judgment, supra note 227, at 663.
Indeed, the Restatement of Judgments provides that "[a] judgment on one cause of action is
not conclusive in a subsequent action on a different cause of action as to questions of fact
not actually litigated and determined in the first action." RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68(2) (1942) (emphasis added). The Restatement illustrates the defendant's ability to
bring an action, where he has failed to raise a counterclaim or defense, as follows:
A, a physician, brings an action against B for medical services rendered to B. B
fails to plead and judgment by default is given against him. B is not precluded
from subsequently maintaining an action against A for malpractice and recovering
for harm done to him by such malpractice.
Id. at § 58, Comment b, Illustration 3 (1942).
See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955, 959 (1969). Of course, the mere opportunity to litigate a claim does not constitute a
"full and fair" adjudication of such claim. Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments:
A Modest Dissent, supra note 233, at 468. Moreover, the absence of a due process violation
does not guarantee that the party has had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate his claim.
People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228 (1980).
236 Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955,
959 (1969).
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judgment would appear to be in derogation of the Court of Ap-
peals' stated position.
In light of the uniform condemnation, by courts and commen-
tators alike,23 7 of New York's default judgment collateral estoppel
rule, it is suggested that the state's courts should not feel com-
pelled to adhere to longstanding precedent.23 8 Rather, the courts
should review the facts of each case to determine whether the pa-
tient-plaintiff has had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the
malpractice issue which is to be estopped.3 9 Of course, if stern ac-
tion must be taken to forestall undue litigation, the legislature
should consider imposing a compulsory malpractice counterclaim
in actions for recovery of medical fees.240 In any event, it is hoped
that the New York courts will, in the future, limit the harsh appli-
cation of the collateral estoppel rule, a rule which unjustly has im-
peded the opportunity of medical malpractice plaintiffs to litigate
their claims.
Caren E. Knobler
237 See note 234 supra.
238 The Court of Appeals has stated that the doctrine of stare decisis will not prohibit
the overruling of judicial precedent when such precedent is in "opposition to the uniform
convictions of the entire judiciary of the land." Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 386, 114
N.E. 809, 811 (1916).
23 See SIEGEL § 451, at 598 (case-by-case determination of the applicability of collat-
eral estoppel to a defaulting patient's medical malpractice claim may be the only practical
way to introduce some flexibility into New York's present approach).
240 Although, presently, all counterclaims are permissive in New York, see SIEGEL § 224,
at 270, a compulsory claim modeled after the federal rule could be judicially or legislatively
adopted. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 58, Comment f (1942). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 13, for instance, provides that a counterclaim must be raised "if it arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." FED.
R. Civ. P. 13(a). Of course, the court in which the physician has brought his claim for pay-
ment for services may lack jurisdiction to award the amount of damages requested in the
patient's malpractice counterclaim. In such situation, the patient may move to transfer the
case to the proper court. See CPLR 325(b) (1972); SIEGEL § 25, at 24-25.
19811
